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DOUGLAS WILDER AND THE 
CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RACE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1989 
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 
Judson L. Jeffries, University of Southern California 
In 1989 Virginia elected an African-American to serve as its chief 
executive officer . Until Douglas Wilder , no African-American had ever 
been elected governor of any state. In 1872, the African-American 
lieutenant-go vernor of Louisiana, P .B.S. Pinchback', was elevated to 
the post of acting governor for 43 days. The operative word here is 
elevated . Success for African-American candidates running for high 
profile2 statewide office has been rare. With the exception of Wilder, 
only Edward Brooke and Carol Mosely Braun have been able to win 
high profile statewide office ; but even when they succeeded, the results 
did not reveal extensive white support for these candidates. 
Pili awsky notes that black3 electoral success has been limited, in 
large part, by the unwillingness of whites to vote for African-
Americans when running against whites . 4 This assessment 
underestimates the amount of white resistance to African-American 
candidates. Racial prejudice has been the major barrier to high profile 
African-Ame rican statewide success. A study by Linda Williams found 
the higher the political office , the more likely it is that whites would 
not vote for an African-American candidate. 5 When whites were asked 
I would like to thank Harlan Hahn , Ann Crigler and Jody Battles for reading 
several drafts of this paper , providing valuable insight and criticisms . Jack 
Tweedie, Michael D. McDonald, Darryl C. Thomas , Gary King, Sidney Verba 
and Hugh Douglas Price also read drafts of the paper in its early stages. l.;ast 
but not least I am indebted to Charles E. Jones who handed over to me his 
extensive archiva l collection on the 1989 Virginia election . Without this data, 
the paper would not have come to fruition. An earlier version of this article 
was presented at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Black 
Political Scientists , Jackson, Miss. 
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whether they would support a qualified African-American for city 
council, 2 .5% reported they would not; 5.2% reported they would not 
support an African-American for mayor; 5.6 % reported they would not 
support an African-American for U.S . senator; and 7.5 % reported they 
would not support an African-American for governor. Topping 
governor was vice president ( 10. 5 % ) and president (20 % ) . 
The notion that voters will support the candidate with whom they 
share skin color is we!J known. 6 Consequent! y, some voters turn to 
race as a simple, readily available cue if they find the competitor ' s 
issue positions equally attractive or equally obnoxious .7 Such an 
argument does not, however counter the fact that voting becomes a 
product of racism if, even before voters become attentive or decide' not 
to become attentive to candidates' policy positions, they have decided 
a priori to vote for one candidate simply on the basis of race, against 
another for the same reason. 
Previous Research 
A small body of literature exists examining the impact of race in 
statewide elections where African-American candidates face white 
candidates. 8 
Sonenshein offers a descriptive study in which he compares the 
statewide candidacies of Edward Brooke, Thomas Bradley and Douglas 
Wilder . 9 Sonenshein argues that race can be overcome if black 
candidates: 1) run in states where whites have liberal attitudes toward 
race; 2) develop a flexible campaign strategy that is amenable to 
whites; and 3) work within the party structure. Citrin, Green and Sears 
studied preelection surveys of registered white voters and voting 
preference in California. The authors found race was not critical in 
Bradley's gubernatorial defeat. White conservatives tended to oppose 
all Democratic candidates. These voters were no more likely to vote 
against Bradley than against Democratic U.S. senate candidate Edmund 
G. Brown, Jr . 
In contrast, other studies found race to be the cause of Bradley's 
1982 gubernatorial defeat. Pettigrew and Alston compared the Bradley 
vote to a 1972 vote on a state proposition that opposed busing public 
school students to achieve racial desegregation. w The counties that 
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favored the anti-busing referendum 10 years earlier tended to vote 
against Bradley for governor. Henry, using regression, analyzed the 
relationship between Democratic registration and the vote for the major 
Democratic candidates on a county-by-county level. 11 He found major 
defection on the part of white Democrats . 
Luebke's study of the North Carolina lieutenant governor's contest 
blames the loss that Howard Lee 12 suffered on race. Because of race, 
Lee was unable to attract a varied segment of the electorate. Luebke 
argues that African-Americans who aspire to statewide office would do 
well to pursue an interracial populist electoral strategy where blacks , 
working-c lass whites, and white middle-class liberals make up a 
coalitio n. 13 
Becker and Heaton deal with race as an aside in their classic study 
of Edward Brooke. 14 Studying preelection public opinion polls during 
the campaign for U.S. senate in Massachusetts, they found that as 
election day grew closer, support for Brooke among whites dropped 
substant ially among voters categorized as most prejudiced ; significantly 
among those labelled less prejudiced and moderately among least 
prejudice d whites. Without the benefit of election results, one cannot 
determine the exact amount of support Brooke received from white 
voters. One could argue that Becker and Heaton's findings were 
understa ted. 
Little scholarly attention has been devoted to the dynamics of the 
campaign per se. Also very little is known about the impact that race 
has in a statewide election where the African-American candidate won. 
No scholarly attention has been devoted solely to this issue . There has 
been research devoted to mayoral contests. 15 However, high profile 
statewide office is distinct from the mayoral office with respect to 
power and constituency. Hence the significance of high profile 
statewide office should be evident. The election of Lawrence Douglas 
Wilder as governor of Virginia makes for a good study. Not only did 
the contest involve an African-American candidate pitted against a 
white candidate, but the African-American candidate won with 40 % of 
the white vote, causing some political pundits to render the race issue 
inconsequential. 16 This study looks at the political dynamics of the 
campaign election as well as survey data and aggregate voting data to 
estimate the impact of race. 
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The Candidates 
Wilder, a Democrat, boasted impressive credentials . A decorated 
veteran and a lawyer by profession , he was elected to the Virginia State 
Senate in 1969, where he served for 16 years. During his tenure as 
state senator , Wilder advanced to chairman of the powerful Privileges 
and Elections Committee which oversees state appointments and voting 
legislation. 17 He also chaired the Democratic Steering Committee as 
well as the Senate Transportation Committee . 18 And in 1985 Wilder 
was elected lieutenant-governor. 
Wilder's opponent, Marshall Coleman , also a lawyer , was elected 
to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1973, where he served for two 
years . From there he served two years as a state senator. In 1978, he 
was elected attorney general of Virginia where he served until 1982. 
Coleman though had a rocky political career . He suffered two harsh 
defeats; once while running for governor (1981), the other while 
seeking the nomination for lieutenant governor in 1985. Having 
alienated Harry Byrd loyalists in the Republican party for seeking black 
support , Coleman was denied a chance to run on his party ticket as 
lieutenant governor. In 1989 he did not even have a strong following 
within his own party. In a sense , he had risen from the political dead . 
Race reverberates in southern politics like no other issue , past or 
present. Almost a half century ago , Key wrote that "in its grand 
outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the 
Negro. "19 He revealed that southern politics was traditionally 
structured to maintain white supremacy , and that most of its 
idiosyncracies were direct or indirect consequences of that fact. 
Although Key found race a major factor in southern politics , he notes 
that in Virginia , race is often a covert issue. Rabble rousing and Negro-
baiting on the part of political aspirants have not been acceptable 
etiquette in the Old Dominion. This particular finding seemed to remain 
true in 1989. Wilder's opponent, Marshall Coleman , upheld the 
Virginia tradition by not calling attention to Wilder 's race. 
Since Wilder 's triumph, politicians and scholars alike have argued 
with fervor that race is no longer a factor in electoral politics. State 
Senator Robert C. Scott, (D-Newport News) argued, that "race turned 
out not to be a factor in the contest. "w Wilder ' s victory provides the 
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foundation for his argument. "It's not an issue," said Scott when asked 
how race would affect the election. "It's incredible that anybody is even 
concerned about it being a factor... I think people are insulted by the 
discussion. "21 "We have been judging candidates by their 
qualifications, not by their race, in Virginia for years. "22 Scott's 
words reek of naivete. The irony is, Scott is African-American. 
The majority of Virginia voters agreed. The CBS News/New 
York Times exit poll asked respondents , "Was Douglas Wilder's being 
black a major reason why you voted as you did for governor?" Of the 
respondents 78 % said race was not a reason at all, 12 % answered a 
"minor" reason and just 8 % admitted it was a "major" reason. 23 
There are at least two reasons to expect that race would be a 
factor in the election. First, Wilder's bid marked the first time a black 
had ever run for governor in Virginia. The very idea that Wilder could 
become the first African-American governor in Virginia, the cradle of 
the Confederacy, which promoted "massive resistance" to court-ordered 
school desegregation, was certain to attract enormous media attention, 
making a racial component unequivocal.2A Pettigrew notes that the first 
candidacy of an African-American increases concern among whites 
regarding the balance of power between the races. 25 This finding is 
exemplified in a comment made by Donald Shinault, a Virginia voter, 
who said "be was worried that Lieutenant Governor Douglas Wilder 
would fill some 4,000 gubernatorial appointments with blacks, 
especially at the top. "26 Second, the political climate in Virginia at the 
time was largely unconducive to the political demands of African-
Americans. During Labor Day weekend, African-American college 
students clashed with national guardsmen at Virginia Beach where they 
converged for a weekend retreat known as Greekfest. 27 The nation 
was bombarded with television images of black youth vandalizing and 
pillaging businesses along the resort strip. The disturbance lasted two 
days and left an estimated $1 .4 million worth of damage in its wake. 28 
One could make the argument that, as racial polarization increases, 
racial voting increases as well. 
In this article I argue that in spite of Wilder's victory, his race 
proved to be a factor in two ways: One, race played a role in the way 
Wilder (cognizant of his skin color) conducted his campaign. And two, 
race influenced the way white votes were cast. 
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Research Design 
In an attempt to assess the impact of race in this election , several 
methods have been employed . First, an examination of Wilder 's 
campaign strategy has been conducted. Since African-Americans do not 
constitute a majority of the population in any state , they lack the 
numerical strength to vote an African-American candidate into a 
statewide office . Hence, African-American candidates who run for 
statewide office have to employ a strategy that allows them to sustain 
-support from the African-American community while at the same time 
not alienating white voters. Second, preelection polls and exit poll data 
are examined to see if: 1) support for Wilder diminished as election day 
approached and 2) there is any discrepancy regarding projected 
outcome and final outcome . Third, the author looks at a breakdown of 
age, education and income levels of the white electorate to see who 
voted for and against Wilder. Conventional wisdom says older white 
voters are less receptive to African-American office seekers than are 
young white voters . Fourth , the level of white support received by 
Wilder in 1989 is compared to the level of white support garnered by 
Wilder in 1985 when he was elected lieutenant governor . Fifth, 
Wilder 's election returns are compared to those of his white 
Democratic running mate, Donald Beyer, a political neophyte. Given 
Wilder's incumbency , one would expect him to fare as well, if not 
better than, his running mate . Finally , a regression analysis using 
precinct level data is employed to determine polarized voting on the 
part of white voters. 
The following analysis identifies the salient features that lend 
support to the aforementioned hypotheses. 
Analysis of Campaign 
Wilder never called for a black take-over. Instead he tried to 
lessen the impact of race by employing a deracialized political strategy. 
This strategy attempts to defuse the divisive effects of race by avoiding 
references to ethnic or racially construed issues , while at the same time 
emphasizing those issues that appeal to a wide community, thus 
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mobilizing a large portion of the electorate. 29 This strategy also 
enhances the prospects for a bi-racial coalition . As was said earlier, 
since African- Americans do not constitute a majority in any state, they 
lack the numerical strength to vote a black candidate into office. Black, 
et al. note that in statewide elections , black potential influence usually 
ranges from sharing in a victory to no influence at all. 30 A successful 
Democratic bi-racial coalition requires that blacks be united and whites 
sufficiently divided in their candidate preferences . 31 In the past , 
African-Americ an office seekers have sought to identify with the poor , 
mostly with the African-American poor espousing black empowerment 
as a campaign theme. 32 This strategy mobilized the African-American 
community but alienated the white electorate . Whites are uncomfortable 
with the "black power " confrontational style of African-American office 
seekers. The deracialized political strategy as defined by McCormick 
and Jones entails three features ; style , issues, and mobilization tactics. 
The author might add to this list the candidate ' s negotiation of the race 
issue per se. 
Wilder's first order of business was to disavow himself from his 
early days as a state senator when he was an advocate of black causes 
and his appearance personified black militancy. In those days, Wilder 
frequented the senate chambers in an Afro and black leather jacket. 33 
In his maiden speech, an occasion usually marked by humility and 
deference to senior members, Wilder denounced the legislature for its 
racist policies. In his first legislative proposal, he demanded that the 
state's anthem ("Carry me back to Old Virginny") be repealed because . 
it celebrates slavery as an institution supposedly beloved by master and 
slave alike. 34 And he introduced resolutions calling for voting rights 
and statehood for the District of Columbia. 
As late as 1984, Wilder pushed for a holiday honoring Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Wilder was, for many of his white colleagues, the 
epitome of the angry young black. 35 Yet during the gubernatorial 
campaign Wilder said, with almost perverse pride, "I have never been 
an activist of any sort . "36 Throughout the campaign, Wilder projected 
an affable and ingratiating image . Where Jesse Jackson might have 
bristled, Wilder postured himself as a "son of Virginia" cozying up to 
Confederate flags, content to embrace, not ridicule , the symbols of his 
home state. 
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Wilder avoided racially inflammatory issues and refused to be 
associated with programs that call for preferential treatment as 
compensation for past discrimination. A study by Robert Holsworth 
found that in the Richmond area, almost 70% of whites felt that 
minorities and women should not be granted special preferences in 
hiring and promotion in order to compensate for past discrimination. 37 
The one time that affirmative action was raised, Wilder sidestepped the 
issue and instead averred that he believed economic growth was the 
best method for lifting those who had yet to be reached by the 
prosperity of the 1980s. In addition, when police in Virginia Beach beat 
African-American college students who had converged there for the 
holiday, Wilder issued a strong "law and order" statement so not to 
seem sympathetic or lenient. He did not speak about the rising rate of 
infant mortality and he said virtually nothing about the increasing 
dropout rates among high school students in urban areas. Wilder also 
avoided any mention of the Supreme Court decision in Richmond v. 
Croson (1989). 38 
Wilder focused on issues that transcend race. He took a pro-
choice stance on abortion, adroitly managing to identify himself with 
a Virginia tradition, featuring Thomas Jefferson in his abortion 
television spots. Wilder vowed not to raise taxes. He advocated 
expansion of an existing state program to subsidize day care for low 
and moderate income parents. He made a commitment to tough 
environmental laws. And he took a firm stance on crime, promising 
to support capital punishment. African-American statewide candidates 
cannot afford to be vulnerable on crime, an issue deeply intertwined 
with racial feelings. 
On the question of race, African-American candidates who seek 
statewide office have to maneuver gingerly. If an African-American 
candidate ' refuses to address the race question, he runs the risk of 
turning off his primary support base, the African-American community. 
If the African-American community perceives the African-American 
candidate as someone who has disowned his race, the African-
American community might withhold support. However, if the African-
American candidate injects the race question into the campaign, he risks 
driving away white voters. 
Wilder downplayed the race issue throughout the campaign. He 
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did not say over and over again, "Elect me to make history." Wilder 
insisted time and again that race was not a campaign issue, that voters 
should be concerned only with his government experience and his 
platform. There were times during the campaign when Wilder 
confronte d the race question with humor and wit. "Can it really be 
taking place here in Virginia?" he slyly asked in mock wonder in an 
address in Petersburg, as reported in The Washington Post. "Are they 
really going to do that there?" "What poison have they poured in the 
water down there? "39 This pawky humor defused the potential 
explosiveness of the situation and assuaged old-time fears that a lot of 
southern whites have about African-American politicians. Wilder made 
his blackness and ground-breaking achievements seem almost boring. 
But at no time during the campaign did Wilder disown his racial 
identity. 
Final ly , African-American candidates cannot afford to run highly 
publicized minority mobilization campaigns for fear of creating a white 
backlash. Hence, Wilder did not pound the pavement soliciting the 
African-Ame rican vote for all of Virginia to see. Instead , he made 
(often closed to the press) more than 65 visits to black churches during 
the final two months of the campaign. 40 The black church provided an 
arena to address the African-American community while affording 
Wilder low visibility. Although Wilder did not court the African-
American community aggressively, African-American turnout exceeded 
white turnout by a margin of 76.6% to 65%. This was a far greater 
African-Ame rican participation rate than those of the last three 
gubernatori al contests. This finding is not surprising for three reasons. 
First, the presence of an African-American candidate has usually 
stimulated African-American voter participation. 41 Support for this is 
illustrated when one compares the African-American turnout rate of the 
1989 gubernatorial election with the African-American turnout rate of 
the 1988 presidential election year. African-American turnout was 
relatively low in 1988 with just 64% of those registered casting a 
ballot. 42 Clearly, African-American voters were not stimulated by the 
candidacies of Mich'ael Dukak:is and Senator Charles Robb . Second, 
African-American progress as measured by the campaign rhetoric of 
previous Virginia governors' administrations has been more symbolic 
than substantive. Hence, African-American voters have realized that the 
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only real hope for African-Americans ever receiving the prosperity that 
has long been denied them is to elect African-American candidates for 
statewide and national office . And third, given the historical 
significance of this election, it is hardly surprising that African-
American voters answered the call in droves. 
Wilder also asked the Rev. Jesse Jackson , the most prominent 
African-American in national politics , to stay out of his campaign for 
governor. Wilder clearly did not want to risk being drawn into the 
morass of national black politics despite arguments by political pundits 
that Jackson's performance in the Virginia Democratic primary on 
Super Tuesday paved the way for Wilder 's election. "I think Jesse is 
an activist" , Wilder told the Associated Press .43 Jackson still frightens 
many white voters who envision him as a civil rights demagogue. 
Hence, Wilder did not solicit Jackson's expertise for fear that Jackson 
would damage his chances for election. Wilder, however, was not 
averse to the campaign assistance of conservative white leaders. He did 
not reject the assistance of former Representative Watkins M. Abbitt. 
"I simply think Mr. Wilder will make a better governor than Mr. 
Coleman, " said Abbitt, who is a conservative Democrat. "He'll carry 
on the tradition of the last two governors. "44 Wilder also did not reject 
the support provided him by House Speaker A.L. Philpott, the don of 
segregationist politics. These conservative Democrats had kept African-
Americans disenfranchised, using the state's poll tax to discourage them 
from voting, and concocting a defiant state "massive resistance" scheme 
that forced the closing of public schools under federal court 
desegregation orders . When asked about his association with Philpott, 
an exasperated Wilder smiled: "A.L. and I are good friends from way 
back. "45 
In spite of Wilder's efforts to eliminate race from the campaign, 
there is ample evidence that suggests race still influenced the election. 
Analysis of Election Returns 
Election broadcasters and political analysts have in recent years 
become quite adept at pinpointing election outcomes. Preelection, 
public opinion and exit polls all pointed to a strong Wilder victory . A 
Washington Post survey of 1,107 likely voters found Wilder leading 
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Coleman 52 % to 37 % a week before the election. 46 On election night, 
the Mason-Dixon exit poll anointed Wilder with a 10%-point triumph, 
55% to 45%. 47 However, the actual vote was a virtual "photo-finish." 
The final election count revealed that Wilder had won by the slimmest 
margin in the history of Virginia gubernatorial elections, 50.1 % to 
49.8%. 48 Why were the polls wrong? This narrow margin of 
victory, compared to the poll results, raises questions about hidden 
racism among voters. The author suggests several possibilities. One, 
a segment of the white electorate was reluctant to tell poll-takers that 
they were not voting for an African-American candidate, particularly 
if the interv iew was conducted face-to- face rather than through a self-
administered questionnaire. In the case of the Mason-Dixon Opinion 
Research exit poll , the interviews were conducted face-to-face. This 
raises the notion of "social desirability. "49 Some whites who voted 
against Wilder because of his race may have felt some social pressure 
to say that they indeed voted for him . Two , when whites encountered 
an African-Ame rican poll-taker, they again lied and said they voted for 
Wilder when they voted for Coleman. White respondents are more 
likely to give liberal or pro-black responses when the interviewer is 
African-Ame rican. 50 Hatchett and Schuman note, in instances like this, 
the white respondent "accommodates," in order to get through the 
racial interaction with minimal tension. Few whites are secure enough 
in themselves to voice their prejudice out loud to someone of the 
opposite race. 51 Three, anti black voters anxious to conceal racist 
feelings might have said they were undecided rather than make the 
hypocritical statement that they would vote for the African-American 
candidate. Fourth, a segment of the white electorate were genuinely 
undecided going into the voting booth. However, notes, political 
scientist Larry Sabato, white voters who are still undecided going into 
the booth are likely to vote for the white candidate. 52 Finally, some 
white voters honestly intended or believed they were going to vote for 
Wilder, but once inside the booth could not bring themselves to cast 
their ballot for an African-American candidate. 
Wilder suffered substantial white defection. According to the CBS 
News/New York Times exit poll, one-quarter (23 % ) of Coleman voters 
supported the Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor, and 29 % 
supported the Democratic candidate for attorney general. In all, 
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Wilder failed to carry 2753 cities and counties that he won in 1985 
when he was elected lieutenant governor. Nearly all of these cities and 
counties are in southwest Virginia, a region where Democratic loyalties 
have traditionally been strong. The views of working class defectors 
from the Democratic Party in the 1988 presidential election were 
studied by Stanley Greenberg who found that these white defectors 
expressed a profound distaste for African-Americans. "African-
Americans constitute the explanation for their [white defector's] 
vulnerability and for almost everything that has gone wrong in their 
lives; not being African-American is what constitutes being middle 
class; not living with African-Americans is what makes a neighborhood 
a decent place to live ... "54 The defection suffered by Wilder also 
strengthens Williams' finding that the higher the political office, the 
less whites are willing to vote for an African-American candidate. 
Race is also reflected in the age, education and income breakdown 
of the percentage of white votes cast against Wilder. Wilder captured 
57 % of the voters aged 18 to 29 compared to only 37 % of the voters 
60 years and older. Terry won 57 % of those 60 years and older. Beyer 
won 48 % of those 60 years and older. 55 It is reasonable to assume that 
the majority of these 60 year old and older voters were white, being 
that the life span of blacks is shorter than that of whites . A 
disproportionate number of 60 year olds and older are white . And 60 
year old and older southern whites (the generation of segregation) are 
less hospitable to African-Americans than are younger southern 
whites. 56 A Washington Post survey lends support to the 
aforementioned finding. A total of 1,249 randomly selected whites were 
interviewed from September 28 to October 3, 1989 regarding their 
perceptions about blacks . A few of the questions that were asked were: 
Do you think that blacks lag behind whites 
economically because most blacks don't have 
the motivation or will power to pull themselves 
out of poverty? 
Do you think blacks are generally worse off 
economically than whites because most blacks 
have less inborn ability to learn? 
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Of the 60 year old and older white respondents , 52 % of them 
indicated negative views of African-Americans compared to 21 % of 
those 18 to 30 year old whites . 57 
Wilder also received the lowest support among those whites with 
the least amount of education. Only 5 % of the white voters who did not 
graduate from high school voted for Wilder. 58 This data coincides 
with the Washington Post survey that found that 55 % of those whites 
who didn't graduate from high school expressed negative views of 
African-Americans, compared to 34 % of those who graduated from 
high school and 23 % of those who graduated from college. Wilder also 
received the lowest support among those who earned under $12,000 
annually. Of these voters, only 7% voted for him. The poll revealed 
that 47% of whites earning less than $12,000 annually expressed 
negative views about African-Americans. 59 Whites with less than a 
high school education and low income have been known to be more 
hostile to African-American office seekers than whites with higher 
levels of education and income. 60 
A fifth indication that suggests race was a factor is reflected when 
comparing Wilder ' s vote against Donald Beyer's (lieutenant governor) 
vote total. Beyer topped Wilder by more than 40,000 votes. 61 That 
Wilder ran so far behind Don Beyer suggests that the Virginia 
electorate is by no means color blind. 
Beyer's significantly stronger showing relative to Wilder's is 
surprising. Both Wilder and Beyer emphasized a pro-choice stance on 
abortion. Both were for capital punishment. And both were well 
financed. The similarities end here, however. Beyer's political fitness 
pales in comparison to Wilder's. Beyer, a car dealer, and a "Johnny-
come-lately," began the race virtually unknown outside his home area 
of northern Virginia. 62 He had never run for any political office 
before. His name recognition was so low that both Democratic 
Governor Baliles and Senator Chuck Robb forgot his name at one point 
during a television interview a week before the election. The most 
apparent difference between the two candidates was that Wilder is 
African-American and Beyer is white. 
A regression analysis was employed to see if whites were voting 
along racial lines. The analyses use aggregated voting data. Thus one 
must be careful in drawing inferences from these data, since one 
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cannot directly measure the motivations of individual voters. 63 The 
units of analysis here are all the precincts64 (N =55) in the city of 
Norfolk, Virginia. Precinct figures on the proportion of the vote for 
Wilder and Beyer, and the racial breakdown of registered voters, were 
obtained from the State Board of Elections. The city of Norfolk was 
chosen for two reasons: 1) it is the largest city in the state of Virginia 
and 2) it consists of both homogeneous and heterogeneous precincts. 
The racial composition of Norfolk is 39.1 % African-American and 
55 % white. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was performed 
using the percentage of the voting age population (V AP) which is white 
as the independent variable and the percentage of voters who voted for 
Wilder and Beyer as the dependent variable. The intercept is the 
percentage of the vote received by Wilder and Beyer in precincts where 
there are no whites. Every precinct in the city (depicted by a black dot) 
is located within the figures. 
The data shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 reveals that B~yer was 
heavily dependent on support from African-Americans. In precincts 
where there are no whites, Beyer received nearly 90% of the vote. 
Wilder, on the other hand, received only moderate support from 
whites. Historically, African-Americans have been more willing to vote 
for white candidates than whites are willing to vote for African-
American candidates. Interestingly, the whiter the precincts get, support 
for Beyer descends. As the white voting age population goes up by 
10 % , the percentage of the vote for Beyer decreases by 4. 3 % . 
A look at the vote for Wilder as shown in Table 1 and Figure 2 
resembles that of Beyer's. For every 10% increase in the white voting 
age population, support for Wilder decreases by 5. 7 % . 
One might argue that the precincts in Norfolk are dominated by 
Republican voters, and that Republicans are voting along party lines. 
One might also contend that Democratic voters are exercising their 
right to cross over and choose another candidate on the basis of a 
particular issue or policy position. Neither of these alternative 
explanations are sufficient. If this were the case, Republican and 
Democratic voters would have voted against Wilder and Beyer at the 
same rate. This was not the case, though. Wilder's percentage of the 
vote decreased at a steeper rate than Beyer's. This suggests that 
something other than party affiliation and issue preference caused 
100 / The Journal of Political Science 
Douglas Wilder 
Table I 
Regression of White Voting Age Population on Vote for Wilder and Beyer 
Significant at . 00 I 
Figure I 
Beyer Vote in Norfolk Precincts 
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Figure 2 
Wilder Vote in No rfolk Precincts 
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voters to behave as they did. The correlation between race and the vote 
for Wilder (r = . 78) is very strong. Wilder was the popular incumbent 
lieutenant governor , Beyer was relatively unknown . So, why would 
Wilder's percentage of the vote decrease at a steeper rate? 
Conclusion 
The wrong inferences have been drawn from Wilder's victory . 
Wilder 's opponent, Marshall Coleman , supported the unpopular side of 
the critical abortion issue. And he made a serious political 
miscalculation when he decided to run a negative campaign against 
Wilder. Simply put, Coleman did not give the Virginia electorate a 
rationale for supporting him over a Democrat with 20 years in state 
government. 
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Wilder, on the other hand, had superior credentials as a long time 
public official . Wilder ran a highly credible campaign as a qualified , 
major-party candidate . He had proven his ability to win a statewide 
election when he was elected lieutenant-governor in 1985. He was 
positioned on the politically advantageous side of the key issues (i.e., 
pro-choice and pro-capital punishment) . Wilder was also seeking to 
succeed two other popular Democratic governors. The Democrats had 
won the two previous gubernatorial elections in the state (Charles Robb 
in 1981 and Gerald Baliles in 1985), and Wilder received the support 
of both men, making Wilder the candidate to beat from the outset. 
Interestingly, Virginia governors traditionally pass the same agenda 
along, largely unchanged, to their successor. 65 Thus, white voters who 
had supported earlier Democratic candidates had few convenient 
"excuses" for withholding support from Wilder. In sum, Wilder was a 
highly qualified upper-middle class candidate with a quiet and 
conciliating style , the kind of qualifications and style most acceptable 
to white voters. So why did Wilder barely escape defeat? The clearest 
explanation is that there was a hard core of white voters who would not 
vote for an African-American candidate. 
Since Wilder 's victory there has been considerable activity at the 
statewide level in the South by black candidates. Most notably , both 
Harvey Gantt and Andrew Young lost their bids for U.S. senator and 
governor, respectively. Thus, the path to statewide success remains, for 
the most part , uncharted. If whites are unwilling to fully support 
qualified black candidates for statewide office, then what chance does 
a black presidential candidate have? The South's influence in 
presidential elections is well documented. 66 It would be nice to believe 
that American politics has reached a point where race is no longer such 
a compelling factor. To be sure, much has changed in the area of race 
relations since Key's study of southern politics , but to dismiss the 
significance of race in contemporary American politics, particularly 
southern politics, is to camouflage reality . 
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